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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD J. RICHARDSON, GROVEL. 
COOK and WAYNE WEAVER, individually 
and for and on behalf of all similarly 
situated shareholders of Major Oil 
Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
ARIZONA FUELS CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, EUGENE DALTON, an 
individual, DEANNE J. DALTON, an 
individual, and MAJOR OIL 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 15691 
B R I E F 0 F R E S P 0 N D E N T S 
An Intermediate Appeal from the Decision of the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge 
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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants incorrectly state the case. The case 
is a combination class-derivative action, in which the lower 
court appointed a receiver to preserve the assets of Major 
Oil Corporation for its creditors and shareholders. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO~lliR COURT 
Plaintiffs' Motions for class eertification under 
Rule 23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and for appointment 
of a Receiver under Rule 66, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
were granted by the Honorable David B. Dee, District Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court, who held that "specific 
minute differentiation" delimiting the type of class action 
"is without merit at this stage in the proceedings" and that 
"notice should be given to the members of the class pursuant 
to Rule 23 (c)" (R.lOS). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The urging of appellants that "the record is totally 
bereftl of any evidence from which the facts of this action 
can be ascertained" (Br. 3) constitutes excessive advocacy, 
l 
bereft: alternative past tense and past participle of bereave: to 
deprive; to strip; to leave destitute; to deprive, as by death. 
Appellants evidently mean to say "devoid". 
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particularly in light of the concession at Br. 7 that "evi-
dence in support of an application for a receiver may be 
furnished . by a properly verified petition used as 
evidence." The trial judge had a verified petition before 
him, which appellants concede was uncontroverted, yet they 
fail to discuss its allegations evidently on the erroneous 
assumption that the record must be encumbered with affidavits 
I or oral testimony. 
/ ~t~ 
\'/ 
The appellees (plaintiffs) filed their complaint, 
' .'_,..;-- and pursuant to leave of the Court, their amended complaint, 
'U 'Y ~ ~ J;'r'l 4-,'v Q:v$J'~r/' JX)th of which were verified by Wayne Weaver, one of the 
v ~ ' Q \ 
r/0 pJ,~ laintiffs. No answers or opposing affidavits were filed. 
cl; Accordingly, all well pleaded allegations of the complaint 
must be taken as the facts herein. 
The allegations of the verified complaint, exclusive 
of those stated to be on information and belief were as follows: 
The amended complaint alleges jurisdictional facts 
(paragraphs 1 through 5, R. 60-61) and that the defendant 
Arizona Fuels is the owner of 47% of the outstanding shares of 
Major Oil (paragraph 2, R.60). The elements of Rule 23(a), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are alleged at paragraphs 6, 7 
and 8 (R.61), including that the plaintiffs are among in 
excess of 1,700 stockholders of Major Oil, residents of many 
states, and that it is impracticable to name them individually 
or make them parties to this action. Significant to appellants' 
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urging that the trial judge did not specify one particular 
type of class action for certification, the complaint alleges 
alternatively each of the three types of class actions set out 
in Rule 23. 
The Rule 23(b) (1) elements, which are generally con-
sidered applicable to cases involving a common fund, as well 
as the Rule 23(b) (2) elements, which are generally considered 
applicable to suits such as civil rights actions seeking 
common injunctive relief are alleged in paragraph 8 (R.61). The 
Rule 23(b) (3) elements, which relate to the common issue suit, 
are also alleged in paragraph 8 (R.61). The elements of 
numerosity, impracticability of joinder, common questions of 
law and fact, common defenses and that the claims of the 
representative parties are typical, and the adequacy of 
representation are all alleged in paragraph 9 (R.6l-62). 
The complaint contains alternative alleaations in 
paragraph 10 (R.62) setting up the elements of a derivative 
action defined by Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Paragraphs 11 and 12 (R.62) allege the facts of Major Oil 
Company being under the control of and dominated by the 
defendants, which are universally held to constitute an 
exception to the usual requirement of a prior demand in 
relation to a derivative suit. 
Turning to the substance of the claims, paragraph 13 
(R.62) alleges that Major Oil owned an oil refinery in Roosevelt 
which was sold at a tax foreclosure sale on or about September _./ 
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24, 1975 by the Internal Revenue Service for taxes owing to 
the United States. Paragraph 14 (R.62-63) alleges that the 
purchaser at the tax sale was Plateau Refining Company of 
Farmington, New Mexico which paid $1,945,055.67 over and above 
the claims of the United States and that the money was de-
posited into the registry of the United States Court for the 
District of Utah for the benefit of the creditors of Major Oil 
and that a trustee was appointed by the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah to administer the funds and to 
make recommendations relative to the claims of creditors. 
Paragraph 27 (R.65) alleges that the defendants caused Major 
Oil, through its officers, who are the defendants herein, to 
acknowledge the validity of a claim against Major Oil in the 
amount of $479,382.35 and caused the trustee to recommend that 
an order be entered to pay that sum to defendant Arizona Fuels 
and that the defendants have done nothing to object to such a 
recommendation by the trustee although it is alleged in para-
graph 28 (R.65) that the claim should be appealed and the 
trustee should be restrained from paying those amounts until the 
validity of the claim is determined. Paragraph 39 (R.66) 
alleges that the defendants have breached their fiduciary 
duties to Major Oil and its shareholders and have "wilfully, 
wantonly or negligently mismanaged the corporate and prudential 
affairs of Major Oil" causing an injury to the corporation 
and its stockholders in the sum of $2,500,000 and paragraph 
14 (R.62-63) alleges that the plaintiffs, for the benefit of 
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Major Oil and its shareholders, are entitled to a judgment in 
that amount. 
In addition, each of paragraphs 17, 23, 24, 29, 32, 
37, 41, 42, 45, 47 and 51 (R. 63, 64, 65-67, 68-69) allege the 
elements of damages and the facts constituting the basis for 
injunctive relief. 
It must be stressed that each of these allegations 
are verified under oath and stand on the record uncontro-
verted. None of these facts are stated on information and 
belief, though the complaint does allege many more facts 
which, in the nature of things, must be alleged on informa-
tion and belief until the case reaches the discovery stage. 
The positive allegations, which are ignored by appellants, 
are nevertheless more than adequate to establish prima facie 
the elements of the cause of action. Without regard for 
additional matters alleged on information and belief (which 
we do not concede may be ignored entirely) these allegations 
establish an adequate factual basis for the trial court's 
order determining the case to be a class action and the 
appointment of a receiver. 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
"ABUSE OF DISCRETION" IS NOT PRESENT 
In 1972 this Court adopted amended Rule 23, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical with the federal 
rule governing class actions. Andrew v. Ideal National 
Insurance Company, 509 P.2d 367 (Utah 1973) is the only case 
in this Court that has arisen under the new rule. The Ideal 
case did not construe the provisions of the amended rule, 
although the trial court did interpret and apply its pro-
visions on the subsequent remand. See Andrew v. Ideal 
National Insurance Company, Docket No. 182-960 (Third District, 
Utah 1977). In the absence of any Utah authority, reference 
will be made to the large body of authorities which have 
developed surrounding the identical federal rule. 
The language of Rule 23 is plainly addressed to the 
sound discretion of the trial judge. Accordingly, it is uni-
versally held that "where [the trial court] does apply the 
criteria to the facts of the case it has a broad discretion as 
to whether the suit may be maintained as a class action, which 
the appellate court should normally respect." 3 B MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE ~I 23.97 at p. 23-1951. In a case arising in 
the Federal District Court for the District of Utah challenging 
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the exercise of discretion by the Honorable A. Sherman 
Christensen, it was held that "if [the trial judge] applies 
the correct criteria to the facts of the case, the decision 
should be considered to be within his discretion." Gold 
Strike Stamp Company v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 (lOth Cir. 
1970). Numerous cases under the federal rule are unanimous in 
the same conclusion.2 
Accordingly, the appropriate standard for judicial 
review on this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial judge 
is guilty of an abuse of discretion. Significantly the 
appellants failed to address that issue in those terms or by 
necessary implication. The most that can be said for the 
appellants' argument is that they claim that it was error for 
the trial judge to certify a class action based upon the 
allegations of the complaint. In an effort to lend some 
dignity to that claim, as previously noted, the appellants 
incorrectly stated that the complaint was on allegations of 
information and belief though in fact the allegations on which 
Cross v. National Trust Life Insurance Co. 553 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 
1977); King v. Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 519 F.2d 
20 (7th Cir. 1975); Shumate & Co. v. National Association of Securities 
Dealers, 509 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1975); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Co., 508 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1975); Kamm v. California City Development 
Co., 509 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1975); Rutledge v. Electric Hose & 
Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1975); Fendler v. Westgate California 
Corp., 527 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1975); Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200 
(lOth Cir. 1973); Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791, 
793 (lOth Cir. 1970); New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics Corp., 
410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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the class action certification hinges were not stated to be on 
information and belief and were verified under oath by the 
named plaintiff. 
In any event, contrary to the urging of the appellant, 
this Court has held under the former equity practice that it 
was error for a trial judge not to certify a class action based 
upon the allegations of the complaint if they were uncon-
troverted, as the verified allegations were uncontroverted in 
this case. West Point Irrigation Co. ~ Maroni ~ Mt. Pleasant 
Ditch Co., 14 Utah 127, 46 Pac. 762 (1896). This Court's 
holding in the West Point case, moreover, is in accord with 
precedent under the identical federal rule (i.e., the pre-
decessor to amended Rule 23). Cf. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp., 383 u.s. 363, 373 (1966) where the reversal of a class 
action complaint on grounds that the plaintiff was illiterate 
and could not understand her verification was reversed: 
We cannot construe Rule 23 or any other one 
of the Federal Rules as compelling courts to 
summarily dismiss, without any answer or 
argument at all, cases like this where grave 
charges of fraud are shown by the record to 
be based on reasonable beliefs growing out 
of careful investigation. The basic purpose 
of the Federal Rules is to administer justice 
through fair trials, not through summary 
dismissals as necessary as they may be on 
occasion . . . If rules of procedure work as 
they should in an honest and fair judicial 
system, they not only permit, but should as 
nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide 
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The federal courts construe the requirements of the revised 
rule, which this Court is called upon to address for the first 
time, the same. See, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, 1 pt. 2 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, which governs administration of 
class actions in the federal courts and declares contrary 
to the urging of Defendants herein -- that "some or all of the 
material facts may be established by pleadings" and that 
"where the issues are simple, or are otherwise fully developed 
in stipulations or factual briefings, it is conceivable that 
the class action determination can be made without a hearing." 
Id. at 111.40. See also, Wolfson v. Solomon, 54 F.R.D. 584, 
589(S.D.N.Y. 1972): 
The findings required under Rule 23, in 
the light of their meaning under our 
court's Civil Rule llA [requiring the 
filing of a motion for class action 
determination within 60 days] do not 
mandate an evidentiary hearing in every 
case. Pleadings and affidavits will 
normally suffice to supply the data 
required. (emphasis added)---
Accord, Gold Strike Stamp Co. v. Christensen, 436 F.2d 791 
(lOth Cir. 1973). 
Apropos the argument of the appellants that the 
action of the trial judge was in error, this court has held 
that the "abuse of discretion" standard is not satisfied by 
merely urging that the relief sought could have been granted 
by the trial court. Warren v. Dickson Ranch Company, 123 
Ut. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th Ed. 
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1968 defines the term to contemplate an action by the trial 
judge which is "clearly against logic and effect of such facts 1 
as are presented in support of the application or against the 
reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from the facts" 1 
and cites in support of that definition State ~ Draper, 83 
Utah 115, 27 P.2d 39 (1933). Black states further that the 
concept implies that the court was not "discreet, circumspect, 
prudent and exercising cautious judgment" citing State Board 
of Examiners ~Spears, 79 Colo. 588, 247 Pac. 563,565 (1926). 
The appellants fail to even approach the appropriate 
standards. There is no allegation that Judge Dee's order 
defies logic or that it is contrary to such facts as were 
presented in support of the request for class action certific~ 
tion. Indeed, the appellants failed to present any facts at 
all by way of affidavit or otherwise and Judge Dee was con-
fronted with nothing other than the verified allegations of 
the complaint. The appellants do not allege, nor indeed could 
they allege, that Judge Dee was not discreet or circumspect or 
that he failed to exercise cautious judgment. 
Appellants' arguments that a particular subdivision 
of the class action rule should have been invoked, or that the 
related provision of Rule 23.1 rather than Rule 23 should be 
invoked cannot constitute abuse of discretion because of the 
contemplation of Rule 23 that the trial judqe may review and 
10 
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modify his determinations as the case progresses. That was 
made clear by the Tenth Circuit in the Gold Strike case, 
supra: 
Since the order allowing the class action 
does not have finality required for appeal 
under F.R. Civ. P. 54(a), a very serious question 
exists as to whether the merits of Gold Strike's 
petition should be examined at all. 
* * * 
For example, under the provisions of Rule 23(c) 
(4) and 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure the trial judge maintains a great degree 
of control over the conduct of a class action 
trial. This control has been commented on by 
this court in Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 
(lOth Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 928, and 
allows the trial judge to modify or terminate 
the action as a class action if it develops that 
the decision to so proceed was inappropriate. 
There is no reason to believe that the trial court will not 
exercise that discretion appropriately if the circumstances 
should subsequently warrant. 
11 
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POINT II 
APPELLANTS' ARGUMENTS ARE REJECTED BY THE HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS AND RELATED DOCTRINES 
The language of the revised Rule 23, Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, was adopted by this Court in 1972. Because 
prior decisions of this Court have never dealt significantly 
with class actions, and have never construed the revised rule 
at all, we present here for the convenience of the Court a 
brief discussion of the background of the revised rule. That 
history vividly illustrates why appellants' contentions are in 
error. 
Class actions, both in this country and at the 
common law, were creatures of necessity invented by equity 
jurisprudence to handle cases where all interested persons 
could not be joined, or where they were so numerous that their 
joinder was impracticable and unnecessary: 
The King of Brogdignag gave it for his opinion that 
"whoever could make two ears of corn, or two blades 
of grass to grow upon a spot of ground where only 
one grew before, would deserve better of mankind, 
and do more essential service to his country than 
the whole race of politicians put together." In 
matters of justice, however, the benefactor is he 
who makes one lawsuit grow where two grew before . 
. Questions of law or fact which would otherwise be 
tried over and over can by this means be determined 
once for all in a single proceeding. This avoidance 
of multiplicity of suits saves the parties from 
needless expense and vexation, economizes the time 
of judges and jurymen, and frees the dockets for the 
affairs of other litigants. Chaffee, SOME PROBLEHS 
OF EQUITY, 149 (1950): 
12 
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The Advisory Committee to the federal rule, from 
which the Utah rule was adopted verbatim, drew heavily upon 
three prescient treatises: Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 
245-46, 256-57 (1950); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary 
Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941); 
Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L. Q. 
327 (1948). Those treatises are virtually required reading 
for one who would understand the nature and effect of class 
actions under the revised rule. 
A. Common Law Antecedents 
The proliferation of class actions durinq the past 
two decades, more or less, in fields like securities law, 
consumer frauds, and civil rights, has created an impression 
of their being a new device. They are not, however, new 
devices at all. They have their roots in equity practice 
extending back more than 300 years to the common law. 
The classic Cooley lectures of Chancellor Zechariah 
Chaffee, Jr., delivered at the University of Michigan in 1949, 3 
trace the history of modern class suits 4 from at least as 
early as 1701, with the common law Bill of Peace with multiple 
parties. Chaffee, supra at 163-166. The common law lord of a 
4 
Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, (1950). 
See also MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.02[1). 
13 
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manor had occasional need to settle matters like customs at 
his mill against the tenants, or the tenants a need to settle 
matters like their fishing rights against the lord. In such 
cases the Bill of Peace was employed. While it was possible 
1 
to join all of the tenants as plaintiffs or defendants, beca~l 
of their sheer numbers it was thought unnecessary to do so. A, 
representative few sued, or were sued, for all: 
Hence it was far cheaper and more convenient to 
have a single suit in chancery, which was 
accustomed to handle polygonal controversies 
it was an obvious waste of time to try the 
common question of law and fact over and over 
in separate actions . . . It was much more 
economical to get everybody into a single 
chancery suit and settle the common questions 
once and for all 
From such a bill of peace it was a natural step 
to a representative suit. The very identity 
of interests which made it easy to bring every-
body in, also made it somewhat superfluous to 
do so. 
If the claims of A, B, C, and D were exactly 
like those of E, F, G, and H, and if A, B, C, 
and D were stout fellows, would not they be 
able to say all that could be said for E, F, 
G, and H as well on their own behalf? Chaffee, 
supra at 201. 
The English courts then extended the concept of the 
bill of peace cases to controversies more like the modern 
class action, such as suits involving the joint stock companiM 
which became popular with the burst of the South Sea bubble. 
In such suits constructive trusts were imposed for the benefit 
14 
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of large numbers of joint venturers on property which the 
company's agent had improperly appropriated to his own use. 
Chaffee quotes Lord Cottenham in Taylor v. Salmon, 4 Myl. & 
cr. 134, 141-2 ( 1838 l : 
[It is] the duty of this Court to adapt its 
practice ... to the existing state of society, 
and to apply its jurisdiction to all those new 
cases which, from the progress daily making 
in the affairs of men, must continually arise, 
and not . . . decline to administer justice, 
and to enforce rights for which there is no 
other remedy." 
The English judges, according to Chaffee, 
had no hesitation in jumping, not only the 
obstacle of unjoined parties, but also the 
obstacle of binding them without a day in 
court. When the representatives on the 
record were such as fairly and honestly to 
try the general questions at issue and not 
betray the interests of their many absent 
associates, then the English judges saw no 
sense in letting the omitted persons 
relitigate matters on which they had 
presumably already heard whatever was worth 
saying. Chaffee, supra, at 213. 
But the common law Bill of Peace with multiple 
parties became impractical to the extent that the English 
judges became preoccupied, just as Appellants are urging this 
Court to do herein, with notions like privity, community of 
interest, and res judicata. During the period of its decline, 
the Bill of Peace with multiple parties was frequently con-
strued as applying only to "Cases where there is one general 
right in all the parties, that is, where the character of the 
15 
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parties, so far as the right is concerned, is homogenous." 
Chaffee, supra, at 165, quoting from Newton v. Egmont, 5 Sim. 
130, 137 (1832). 
B. The Early American Class Action 
The common law Bill of Peace with multiple parties 
was adopted early in the United States as the "class action". 
Just as Lord Eldon fostered the doctrine in England, Justice 
Story formulated the American doctrine. See, 3B MOORE'S 
FEDERAL PRACTICE 1123.02 [1] at page 23-38. As in England, 
class actions were created out of necessity to handle suits in 
which the large numbers involved rendered it impractical to 
join them all. Hansberry~ Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940). 
One of the earl1est cases in the U.S. was Smith v. Swormstedt, 
16 How. [57 U.S.] 288 (1853) in which it was held that a 
"common issue" suit by a few may be binding on the rights of 
many, provided the suit is fairly conducted. 
The class action was embodied in Federal Equity Rule 
38, adopted in 1912, which declared that "When the question is , 
one of common or general interest to many persons constituting 
a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them 
all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the 
whole". Utah adopted the equity Rule in Co~p. L. Utah §3184 
(1888). Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur ~Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921 
held that the decree in such a case may be res judicata even 
16 
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against those who are not before the Court, if the representa-
tion was adequate. Accord, West Point Irrigation Co ~Maroni 
& Mt. Pleasant Ditch Co., 14 Utah 127, 46 Pac. 762 (1896). 
The binding effect of class action judgments is thus 
dependent upon the same equity concepts as the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §68 (1942). See 
also Justice Traynor's opinion in Bernhard~ Bank of 
America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 8ll-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-5 (1942). 
The derivative action, which appellants would have 
this Court hold is somehow inconsistent with- the class action, 
derives from the same equity concepts. The derivative action 
was Equity Rule 27, and was incorporated with the class action 
in Rule 23(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937). 
C. The Modern Class Action 
With the merger of law and equity under the rules of 
civil procedure the former equity practice was adopted in Rule 
23, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule as it existed 
prior to the 1972 revision attempted to define class actions 
in terms of jural relationships which resulted in the "true", 
"hybrid" and "spurious" categories. Keefe, Levy & Donovan, 
supra, criticized those same classifications in the federal 
rule as artificial and unrealistic: 
But granting that there exist in the law 
examples of distinctions based on differences 
among jural relationships, does it necessarily 
follow that we must make distinctions on 
this basis as to the binding effect of 
class suit judgments? In other words (and 
without essaying facetiousness), granting 
17 
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that a black dog can be distinguished from 
a white one, the distinction is of no force 
when the necessity of obtaining a dog 
license arises. Is there not danger of 
falling into an attitude of unthinking 
formalism, like that of the old common law, 
when we start assuming that all legal 
distinctions are meritorious in and of 
themselves and forget that they should be 
constantly examined in the light of the 
purpose they were originally drawn to 
serve? Keefe, Levy & Donovan, Lee 
Defeats Ben Hur, 33 Corn. L.Q. 327, 332 
(1948). 
Kalven and Rosenfield observed that to require 
strict adherence to res judicata is to vitiate the purpose of 
the class action, for then "the rule is reduced to saying 
that where it is impracticable to bring all the parties before 
the court they must nevertheless be brought before the court." 
KalveP & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class 
~~:!:_t_, 8 ll. Ch.l. i,. Rev. 684, 700 (1941). 
Significantly, it is preoccupation with jural 
r~lationships and strict adherence to the concept of res 
judicata, precisely, which appellants urge upon this Court. 
Chancellor Chaffee, who the Advisory Committee relied upon, 
argued eloquently against the retention of such formalistic 
notions: 
If a mighty wind swept away all the bills 
of peace cases yet decided and dispelled 
the atmosphere of unreality that hovers 
about,this subject, so that we could make 
a fresh start, we should never set up 
formulae about privity, community of in-
terest, and general property right. Every-
body would accept the general principle 
admirably stated by Judge Woolsey: " 
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the avoidance of multiplicity of suits by 
every device, which is jurisdictionally 
possible and practically convenient, should 
be encouraged and should be one of the main 
objectives of procedural administration, 
and of decisions by courts in practice 
cases." Then we should go on to examine 
the available methods of handling a multiple 
controversy, and the practical policies 
which should influence a judge in choosing 
among these methods. 
What prevents our making this fresh start 
now? Even if the doctrine of stare decisis 
has any proper application to a procedural 
problem of this sort, there is excellent 
authority, as we have seen, for taking the 
attitude suggested. Chaffee, so~ PROBLEMS 
OF EQUITY, 183 (1950). 
The Advisory Committee did exactly as Chaffee had 
suggested and swept away definitions based upon jural relation-
ships. The revised rule's three types of class actions, by 
contrast, are stated in terms of controlling criteria believed 
to describe in more practical terms the occasions for main-
taining a class action. The Advisory Committee's criticism of 
former Rule 23 was as follows: 
Difficulties with the original rule. The 
categories of class actions in the original 
rule were defined in terms of the abstract 
nature of the rights involved: the so-
called "true" category was defined as 
involving "joint, common, or secondary 
right"; the "hybrid" category, as involving 
"several" rights related to "specific 
property"; the "spurious" category, as 
involving "several" rights affected by a 
common question and related to common 
relief. It was thought that the defini-
tions accurately described the situations 
amenable to the class-suit device, and also 
would indicate the proper extent of the 
judgment in each category, which would in 
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turn help to determine the res judicata 
effect of the judgment if questioned in a 
later action. 
Thus the judgments in "true" and "hybrid" 
class actions would extend to the class 
(although in somewhat different ways); the 
judgment in a "spurious" class action would 
extend only to the parties including inter-
venors. 
In practice the terms "joint," "common," 
etc., which were used as the basis of the 
Rule 23 classification proved obscure and 
uncertain. The courts have considerable 
difficulty with these terms. 
Nor did the rule provide an adequate guide 
to the proper extent of the judgments in 
class actions. First, we find instances of 
the courts classifying actions as "true" or 
intimating that the judgments would be 
decisive for the class where these results 
seemed appropriate but were reached by dint 
of depriving the word "several" of coherent 
meaning. Second, we find cases classified 
by the courts as "spurious" in which, on a 
realistic view, it would seem fitting for 
the judgments to extend to the class. 
(Citations omitted) 
The revised rule, thus, did not effect any change in 
the substance of class actions, but sought to eliminate the 
unrealistic formalism of the former rule and vest the trial 
judge with a broad range of discretion to supervise the class 
action and control its res judicata effect. See 1 MOORE'S 
RULES PAMPHLET (1975) comment to Rule 23 at 535. 
The "opt out" procedure, which is central to 
appellants' claim that the trial judge erred, was also an 
innovation with the revised Rule. The former rule employed an 
"opt in" procedure, under which the class action was viewed as 
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nothing more than a "permissive joinder" device. That phil-
osophy was also criticized by Kalven & Rosenfield, The 
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
684, 687-688 (1941): 
The cardinal difficulty with joinder, 
however, is that it presupposes the pro-
spective plaintiffs' advancing en masse on 
the courts. In most situations such 
spontaneity cannot arise because the various 
parties who have the common interest are 
isolated, scattered, and utter strangers to 
each other. Thus while the necessity for 
group action through joinder clearly exists, 
the conditions for it do not. It may not 
be enough for society simply to set up 
courts and wait for litigants to bring 
their complaints -- they may never come. 
It is not so much a matter of permitting 
joinder as of ensuring it. 
The Advisory Committee responded with the "opt out" procedure, 
which ensures joinder of the interested parties unless they 
make an election otherwise. 
In doing so, the Advisory Committee sought to 
mitigate, if not eliminate 5 , the inequity of "one way inter-
vention", illustrated by the late Judge Ritter's much dis-
cussed decision in Union Carbide ~ Carbon Corp. ~ Nisley, 300 
F.2d 561 (lOth Cir. 1961) pet. cert. dism. 372 u.s. 801 (1963). 
But see Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (lOth Cir. 1968) cert. denied 
394 U.S. 928 (1969) where class action procedures under the revised 
rule were invoked after judgment on the merits. Hirschi illustrates 
that, if the "opt out" notice is not given, the rule's purpose to 
eliminate "one way intervention" also may not be accomplished and that, 
in such event, Union Carbide still represents sound law. 
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"One way intervention" permits the absentee class members in a 
"common issue" 6 suit to sit back and wait for the result. If 
the named plaintiff won, they then intervened and claimed the 
benefits of the judgment. If the decision was adverse, they 
simply ignored it in favor of pursuing their individual rights. 
The notice imposing the "opt out" requirement, directed to the 
absentees early in the litigation, thus forces them to make an 
election well before judgment. It is that procedural reform, 
inserted as a protection for defendants and committed to the i 
discretion of the trial judge, which appellants argue vigorous~~ 
against. Read in light of the history of the Rule, it is I 
evident that appellants simply misconceive the function and 
effect of the "opt out" notice. 
6 "One way intervention" is not a problem in the so called "common fund" 
suits under Rule 23(b) (l), or suits involving "common rights" under 
Rule 23(a) (2). Because of the joint nature of the property interests 
and rights in such suits the doctrine res judicata applied to the decree. 
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POINT III 
THE VERIFIED ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 
ADEQUATELY SUPPORT CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Appellants' Point II, which represents the second 
prong of their dual attack on the trial judge's action, is a 
pedantic dissertation on counsel's view, advanced without 
citation of authority, on the relative merits of a class 
action vs. a derivative action, and whether the various species 
of a class action are mutually exclusive of one another. In 
truth, appellants are not only without supporting authorities 
for their highly formalistic view of what is really but a rule 
of procedure, but their view is rejected by the history of the 
revised Rule discussed in Point II, as well as by logic and 
case authority under the federal rule. Numerous cases have 
held that class actions and derivative actions may be pursued 
simultaneously. ~., Herpich ~Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th 
Cir. 1970). And, though appellants evidently prefer not to 
give class members the courtesy of the "opt out" procedure, 
the trial judge is well within his discretion to require such 
a notice. Air Line Stewards & Stewardesses Association v. 
American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973). 
A. The Form of Class Action is not Mutually Exclusive. 
Commencing at Br. 15, appellants reason that it was 
error not to certify this action only under Rule 23(b) (1), which 
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has to do with the "common fund" type lawsuit, rather than to 
certify it under Rule 23(b) (3) as well, which has to do with 
the so-called "common issue" type lawsuit. Implicit in 
appellants' arguments is that the various forms of class 
action are mutually exclusive. That position misconceives 
the purpose of the amended rule, and the authorities which have 
construed its identical provisions in the federal courts. 
1. A Primary Purpose of the Revised Rule 
was to Abandon Formalistic Classifications. 
At Br. 16 appellants urge that, "in the venerable 7 
vernacular of the former Rule, [this case must be] a 'true' 
class action," and cite in support of that proposition a 
Harvard Law Review student note published before the Utah 
Rule, or the federal rule on which it is based, were even 
promulgated. A major purpose of the revised rule was to 
escape from such formalism which had proven unworkable and 
meaningless under the former rule. See, 3 B MOORE's FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, ~123.01[8]. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which may be considered 
7 Venerable: worthy of respect or reverence by reason of age and 
dignity, character, position, etc. The vernacular appellants refer to 
could hardly be "venerable", for it was discarded in the revised rule. 
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relevant to the Utah Rule, are quoted at length in Point II 
and expose the fallacy of appellants' argument. The Advisory 
committee declared: 
Difficulties with the original rule .... 
In practice the terms "joint," "common," 
etc., which were used as the basis of the 
Rule 23 classification proved obscure and 
uncertain. The courts had considerable 
difficulty with these terms ...• 
In short, appellants' arguments on this score, which 
are typical of their arguments throughout, amount to a 
syllogistic exercise based on a major premise that is a semantic 
error (i.e., that to sue as representative of all shareholders 
is necessarily to sue as representative of the corporation). To 
that extent appellants' argument is devoid of pertinent 
analysis. Appellants urge upon this Court a philosophy that 
is not only outmoded, but rejected by the language of the 
Rule which is to be construed. 
2. Authorities Support a Flexible Approach 
to Class Certification. 
Contrary to appellants' urging that the class may be 
certified under one, and only one, subdivision of the Rule, 
Professor Moore states the proposition as follows: 
The three types of class suits are not 
always mutually exclusive. Indeed, at times 
there is much overlap. And while a class action 
of the third type may qualify less frequently as 
a type one or type two class suit, a class action 
that meets the requirements of either or both of 
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the first two types may well satisfy the require-
ments of the third type. 3 B MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ~I 23.31[2] (footnote omitted) 
Thus, class actions are frequently certified under more than 
one subdivision. ~-~·· Branham v. General Electric Co., 63 
FRD 667 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). Cf. Harris~ Dumont Co., 61 FRD 
423 (E. D. Pa. 1973). Particularly where a case is at its 
inception, as this one is, the trial court should exercise its 
discretion liberally. In that regard subdivision (c) (1) of 
the Rule directs that "an order under this subdivision may be 
conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision 
on the merits." Subdivision (d) vests the trial judge with 
further discretion, including in particular that he may enter 
orders concerning the class allegations as the action progress~. 
Appellants would have this Court emasculate the dis-
cretion mandated by the Rule and cast the action in formal 
strictures, at its inception, which the Advisory Committee to 
the federal rule plainly effected to avoid. 
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B. Submission of Notice Was Within 
the Discretion of the Trial Judge. 
The argument, commencing at Br. 18, against ex-
tending absentee class members the right to "opt out" is also 
a misconception of the nature and function of class actions. 
We can concede that, so long as the trial judge is of the view 
that the action is maintainable as a class action under Rule 
23(b) (1) (i_.~., the "common fund" type suit) notice and the 
right to "opt out" is not a necessity, but under subdivision 
(d) of the Rule, the trial judge has the discretion to invoke 
that procedure in any type class action. The "opt out" pro-
vision is not absolute in any event, and is but a reasonable 
procedural device to determine the wishes of the absentees who 
are not represented by counse1. 8 The court remains the 
"guardian" of the class and determines, under Rule 23(c) (3) 
who will be bound by the "common issue" type suit. Moreover, 
properly conceived, the effect of such a procedure is not to 
prejudice defendants, but merely affords them the advantage of 
avoiding the claims of those who opt out. 
8 
That is particularly so when it is considered that the absentees, 
responding to a class notice without the benefit of counsel, will fre-
quently misunderstand and take action unrelated to the action or the 
contents of the notice. The court must then exercise its discretion to 
determine who, consistent with well established principles of equity, 
will be bound. To illustrate the point, we reproduce some of the responses 
of class members in a suit by the State of North Carolina, through its 
Attorney General, Robert Morgan, filing suit against five major drug firms 
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The argument that those who opt out can subject 
the defendants to a vexatious multiplicity of suits is sheerly 
conjectural and illusory, at best. This Court need not 
8 continued 
for a class composed of all persons who had purchased certain broad 
spectrum antibiotic drugs in North Carolina between certain dates in 
1954 and 1966: 
Dear Sir: 
I received this paper from you. I guess I really don't understand 
it. But if I have been given one of these's drugs I was not told why. 
If it means what I think it means though, I have not been with a man 
in 9 years if that answers your question. 
Dear Mr. Clerk: 
I have your notice that I owe you $300.00 for selling drugs. I have 
never sold any drugs, especially those that you have listed. 
I have sold a little whiskey once in a while though. 
Dear Mr. Attorney General: 
I am sorry to say this but you have the wrong John Doe because in 
1954 I wasn't but 3 years old and didn't even have a name. Mother named 
me when I got my dr1ver's license, and that was just four years ago. My 
dad signed for me to get them, and until then they just called me Baby 
Doe. 
I couldn't have bought any drugs at 3 years old and I am not but 19 
now and haven't had a name but 4 years so you must have the wrong person. 
Dear Sir: 
I am unable to attend your class. I have been sick. My husband 
will not be able to make it either. We would like for you to get some 
one else to attend in our place. 
Dear Mr. Clerk: 
I would like to know why I am a party to this action that I don't 
know nothing about. Who made me a party to anything? (I am a democrat.) 
Dear Attorney General: 
Holy greeting to you in Jesus name. I received a card from you and 
I don't understand it, and my husband can't read his. Most of the time 
all I buy is olive oil for healing oil after praying over it, it is 
anointed by God's power and ain't nothing like dope. 
Dear Sir: 
I am pleading '1uilty to the use of an envelope of Official Business 
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indulge in such speculation, for the results of the notice are 
now known. Of 1,625 notices which were submitted, only 20 
slightly more than 1% -- opted out. Considering the confusion 
8 continued 
because I did not know if you had one available that you could not use 
it. I have never done that before and will never do it again. 
Dear Sir: 
I have not bouth none of tat stuff from nobodie and I don't know 
notin about it. 
Dear Sir: 
I have not been to a doctor in thirty-five years but for three times 
in these long years and I got hurt in a car wreck once and got my finger 
hurt. I am sorry that such message got out on me for I am a married man 
and I work hard to care for my family. Would you please send me the 
names of the people who claimed such unlawful acts about me. 
Dear Sir: 
I received your pamphlet on drugs, which I think will be of great 
value to me in the future. 
Due to circumstances beyond my control I will not be able to attend 
this class at the time prescribed on your letter due to the fact that my 
working hours are from 7:00 until 4:30. 
Dear Sirs, Sir or whatever: 
. • . But if governmental officials have nothing better to do than 
to sit on their "capitals" and to make lawsuits, heaven help us all. I 
know that I may be utterly wrong but until better informed by Higher 
sources I will continue to think the same. 
Dear Sir: 
This is a request to be excluded from the class. Whatever gave you 
the belief that I was a member of such a class. I never take drugs. 
Maybe an aspirin once in a while, but I can't even take but one of them 
at a time. 
Dear Sir: 
Our son Bill is in the Navy, stationed in the Carribean some place. 
Please let us know exactly what kind of drugs he is accused of taking. 
from a mother who will help if properly informed. 
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lay persons have with the notice (see responses quoted at note 
it is unlikely that any of them represent a threat of multi-
plicity of suits, but even if they did it is still better, in 
the words of Lord Eldon, "to go as far as possible towards 
justice than to deny it altogether." 9 
The res judicata effect of any judgment entered is 
dependent on matters entirely aside from the form of the notice. 
The res judicata effect of a class suit judgment is involved 
with the distinction between a "compulsory joinder" type suit, 
which may be assumed to embrace the provisions of Rule 23(b) 
(1) and (2), and the "common issue" type suit which is embraced 
in Rule 23 (b) (3). These distinctions are exposed in Kalven & 
Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684, 708-14 (1941). It is there pointed out 
8 continued 
Dear Mr. Morgan: 
I received your card about the lawsuit and I would like to how much 
I owe and I can pay it off by the month so I won't have to go to court. 
If I can pay by the month, I will do just that as soon as I hear from 
you. 
To Whom This May Concern: 
About this lawsuit, I can't see how you or anyone can build a 
case after something I know nothing about, I can't imagine what it's all 
about, and about some kind of class I'm supposed to be in. I'm sorry, 
I'm in no kind of class, I'm only a mother and housewife, I do not have 
any kind of trade or class. 
Sorry I can't concern myself in something I have no dealing. 
9 Chaffee, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY, 205 (1950) quoting from Duke of 
Bedford v. Ellis, L.R. [1901] A.C. 1, 8-11. 
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that the "compulsory joinder" type cases "amount to nothing 
more than a common question plus a strong policy in favor of 
a remedy for the group," citing Shields v. Barrow, 17 How. (U.S.) 
130 (1854). Such cases are exemplified by the "common fund." 
On the other hand, the "common issue" case contemplated by 
Rule 23(b) (3), in which a large group may have individual 
damage claims which turn on an issue like whether an offering 
circular was misleading, do not exhibit the strong policy in 
favor of a group remedy though they do present even stronger 
needs for judicial efficiency. In the latter cases, but 
not the former, the "opt out" procedure is made available by 
the Rule to avoid the effects of "one way intervention" under 
the former rule. 10 The giving of notice, therefore, advances 
res judicata and appellants simply misconceive class action 
procedures in urging otherwise. 
At this stage in the proceedings this case could be 
either. It could be a "common fund", composed of assets of 
Major Oil which allegedly are being misappropriated. It could 
also constitute a "common issue" type case involving whether 
Major Oil's management is guilty of fraud expending itself on 
the individual shareholder's interest. It could also be 
both. It was correct, therefore, for the trial judge to 
maintain the action under both theories and furnish the notice 
10 See the discussion of Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 
561 (lOth Cir. 1961) pet. cert. dism. 37, U.S. 801 (1963) at pages 
21 and 22. 
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required in a "corrunon issue" suit. The giving of notice, 
moreover, could only enhance the res judicata effect, to the 
extent that it brings the action to the attention of those 
affected by it. 
The provisions of Rule 23(c) (3) are self-executing 
as regards the binding effect of a class action under Rule 
23(b) (1) --it will be binding on all persons who the Court 
determines are members of the class. 
Appellants' view that the "opt out" procedure nec-
essarily affects the decree's res judicata effect involves the 
very logical fallacies condemned by Keefe, Levy & Donovan's 
treatise discussed in Point II. 
The cases under the federal rule support that view. 
While it is sometimes held that a Rule 23(b) (1) class action 
is preferred to avoid the expense of notice, Stavrides ~ 
Mellon Bank, N.A., 20 F.R. Serv. 2d 1341 (W.D. Pa. 1975), that 
is no objection in this case because notice has already been 
submitted. On the other hand, it is held that the court may 
not defeat the "opt out" provisions by merely labeling the 
action a Rule 23 (b) (1) type class suit, Air Line Stewards & 
Stewardesses Ass'n. v. American Airlines, 490 F.2d 636 (7th 
Cir. 1973), and where there are elements of an individual 
damage claim the notice and opportunity to opt out is mandatory. 
Smith~ Readers Digest Association, Inc., 19 F.R. Serv. 2d 
501 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). It is also held that in some cases the 
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claims must be separated and treated under different provisions 
of the Rule. Williams ~Local 19, Sheet Metal Workers 
International Ass'n., 59 FRD 49 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Richardson 
~Hamilton International Corp., 62 FRD 413 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
C. The Trial Judge's Action Was Supported by The 
Uncontroverted Allegations of the Verified Complaint 
Under the revised federal rule, from which Rule 23, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, was adopted, it is held that it 
is error for the trial judge to fail to enter findings on the 
three mandatory elements of Rule 23(a), and the alternative 
elements of Rule 23(b), in certifying a class action. Esplin 
~Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (lOth Cir. 1968). cert. den. 394 u.s. 
928 (1969). We acknowledge that to be sound law, which 
should be adopted herein, and even though appellants raise no 
question concerning the form of the order certifying the class 
action the following observations concerning the posture of this 
certification vis-a-vis the Hirschi precedent are appropriate. 
This case, unlike Hirschi, arises on the uncontroverted 
allegations of the verified complaint. The allegations of 
that complaint, therefore, must be taken as the facts herein. 
The four mandatory elements of Rule 23(a) (i.e., numerosity, 
common questions of law or fact, representative claims or 
defenses and adequacy of representation) are alleged at 
paragraphs 6 and 8 (R.61). The alternative elements of 
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Rule 23(b) (i.e., a risk of varying or inconsistent adjudi-
cations which would be inconsistent or dispositive, refusal 
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, and 
predominance of common questions of law and fact and 
superiority of the class action to adjudicate the controversy) 
are alleged in paragraph 7 (R.61) of the complaint. Standing, 
as they do, uncontroverted these allegations have the same 
dignity in the posture of this case as specific findings. 
Moreover, the case stands in quite a different 
posture than Hirschi. This case is at a preliminary pleading 
stage, whereas Hirschi was decided on appeal from a final 
disposition on a jury verdict. Thus, a challenge to the trial 1 
judge's orders is premature, or at the very least the matter 
should be remanded for the entry of appropriate findings --
which is a mere administrative matter in view of the uncon-
troverted allegations. If it is thought necessary this Court 
may "suggest" on its own initiative, under Rule 75(h), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, that appropriate findings be entered. 
Under Rule 75(h) the trial judge may also correct the record 
while this appeal is pending, or the matter may be left to 
his discretion following remand. In either event there is no 
need, nor is it appropriate, to disturb the action of the 
trial judge at this stage in the proceedings. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY EXERCISED HIS DISCRETION 
TO ALLOW MAINTENANCE OF A COMBINATION 
DERIVATIVE-REPRESENTATIVE ACTION 
The first prong of appellants' dual attack on the 
class certification is that, in the view of appellants, the 
allegations of the Complaint present what is more properly a 
derivative action under Rule 23.1. Appellants' theory is in 
error for at least two reasons. 
A. Representative and Derivative Actions May be Pursued 
Simultaneously 
Again reasoning without authorities, appellants 
urge at Br. 10-11 that if there were not some mutual incon-
sistency between asserting corporate claims and individual 
claims by the shareholders, "Rule 23.1 . . would be 
somehow appurtenant to Rule 23 itself." In advancing that 
argument appellants have evidently forgotten, or choose to 
ignore, that Rule 23.1 was, indeed, a mere appurtenance to 
Rule 23 itself before the 1972 revision. 11 Rule 23.1 derives 
11 
Rule 23.1, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is also identical with Rule 
23.1, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Its substance was formerly con-
tained in Rule 23(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1937). The 
Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 revision of the federal rule indicate 
merely that such actions have "distinctive aspects which require the 
special provisions set forth in the new rule, but 3 B MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE, ~[23.1.0[1] indicates that the "problem" was whether the 
requirements of clause (1) of the rule that the plaintiff be a share-
holder violated the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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from the same equity principles as Rule 23. Appellants concede 
that to be so at the bottom of Br. 11, but the implication 
that representative actions and derivative actions are there-
fore common tools in the arsenal of equity techniques, quite 
proper to use in tandem as the trial judge has done, escapes 
them. 
Appellants never suggest any way in which they are 
prejudiced by the preliminary certification under both Rules 
23 and 23.1. If that claim is tied to their objection to the 
giving of notice, which seems likely, the notes of the Advisory 
Committee to the federal rule are conclusive against any such 
claim, for the Advisory Committee indicated that "the court 
has inherent power to . . . require that any appropriate 
notice be given to shareholders or members." 
Appellants' "facile12 equation" advanced at Br. 11 
is superfluous, for it is not supported by a single authority. 
To the contrary, commentators discuss the two types of pro-
ceedings as alternative forms of action, ~-~·· JENNINGS AND 
MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION, 958-959 (2d ed. 1968). The 
logic of that position is self evident, for any wrong to the 
corporation must necessarily expend itself on the shareholders' 
12 
Facile: easy to be done or performed; easy; not difficult; performable 
or attainable with little labor. The term is well chosen, in the context 
of the pleadings, even if the inconsistencies appellants imagine were found 
to exist. Rule 8(e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, does permit the 
plaintiff to plead inconsistently. In that sense, we concede the "equation" 
to be 11 facile". 
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interest. There may not, of course, be a dual recovery, but 
there is no reason why the trial judge may not keep both 
alternatives open at this stage of the proceedings. The only 
reported Utah case dealing significantly with class actions, 
Salt Lake City ~Utah Lake Farmers Association, 4 U.2d 14, 
286 P.2d 773 (1955) was decided under the former rule and 
does not arise in a corporate setting, but there are a multi-
tude of cases under the identical federal rule in which 
representative and derivative actions are pursued simul-
taneously. ~.~., Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
The maintenance of either form of action is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the court, upon the allegation of 
the appropriate elements of the respective rules, King ~ 
Kansas City Southern Industries, Inc., 519 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 
1975), but the rules are to be liberally construed in favor of 
the class action, Id., citing Esplin~ Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 
(lOth Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). In 
such circumstances it is held that a court may not deny a 
class action on the ground that there is no need for it. 
Fujishima ~Board of Education, 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). 
Accord, Esplin~ Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (lOth Cir. 1968), 
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969). These propositions were 
adopted and implemented by the trial Court in Andrew ~ Ideal 
National Insurance Co., Docket No. 182960 (3rd Dist. Utah, 
1977) following remand in Andrew v. Ideal National Insurance 
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Co., 509 F.2d 367 (Utah 1973). 
Indeed, the notes of the Advisory Committee for the 
federal rule (from which the Utah rule was adopted) refer to 
suits for all of the shareholders of a corporation as appro-
priate class actions, notwithstanding the availability of ~ 
derivative action: 
In an action by policy holders against a 
fraternal benefit association attacking a 
financial reorganization of the society, it 
would hardly have been practical, if indeed 
it would have been possible, to confine the 
effects of a validation of the reorganization 
to the individual plaintiffs. Consequently 
a class action was called for with adequate 
representation of all members of the 
class. (citing) For much the same reason 
actions ~ shareholders to compel the 
declarat~on of a dividen~ the proper 
recogn~t~on and-handl~ng of-redempt~on or 
pre-empt~on rights, or the like (or actiOns 
by the corporation for corresponding 
declarations of rights), should ordinarily 
be conducted as class act~ons, although the 
matter has been much obscured by the 
insistence that each shareholder has an 
individual claim. (citing) (These share 
holders' actions are to be distinguiShed 
from derivat~ve actions ~ shareholders 
dealt with in new Rule 23.1). (emphasis 
added)--------
The Court is undoubtedly aware that at this point there are 
hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of reported cases in the 
securities field in which the shareholders of corporations are 
represented in class actions. In fact, the only authority 
cited by defendants is a student note in the Harvard Law 
Review published in 1958 -- fourteen years before the current 
Utah rule and eight years before the federal rule were even 
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promulgated and therefore not even pertinent to the matters at 
bar. 
B. Pleading Inconsistently is Permitted Under the Rules 
in any Event. 
It must be remembered that "the party who brings a 
suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon," Bell 
~Hood, 327 u.s. 678, 681 (1946). It is thus not surprising 
that there is a near total absence of authority discussing 
any supposed distinction, or mutual inconsistency, between 
the representative and derivative forms of actions -- for 
the provisions of Rule 8(e) (2) seem dispositive against the 
position of defendants: 
A party may set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim or defense alternatively or 
hypothetically, either in one count or defense 
or in separate counts or defenses . . . • A 
party may also state as many separate claims or 
defenses as he has regardless of consistency and 
whether based on legal or on equitable grounds 
or on both. 
The Utah cases construing Rule 8(e) (2) clearly 
hold that the plaintiffs may, at their option, assert incon-
sistent claims. See Rosander ~Larsen, 14 U.2d 1, 376 P.2d 
146 (1962), in which it was held reversible error to require 
a plaintiff to make an election at pretrial between negligence 
claims and claims under the Workman's Compensation Act. 
The amended complaint alleges the elements of a 
class action at paragraph 8 and 9 (R.61) and then alleges 
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the alternative elements of a derivative action at para-
graphs 10, 11 and 12 (R.62). The rules do not permit the 
defendants, or indeed the court at the pleading stage, to 
elect between those two theories. 
We might well pose the question of why, if "it 
makes little practical difference to the Defendants whether 
the plaintiffs elect to proceed herein as a Rule 23(b) (1) 
class action or as a Rule 23.1 shareholders derivative 
suit," Br. 15 Appellants incur the expense of this challenge 
to the trial judge's exercise of discretion and urge that 
the right of recovery "belongs" to the corporation. The 
answer may be in the disclosure contained in the deposition 
of Eugene Dalton, President of Major Oil Corporation, and his 
counsel, when queried about the application of Major Oil's 
assets to the benefit of Arizona Fuels Corporation as alleged 
in the complaint. 
MR. AXLAND: Now, as to Hajor Oil receiving 
the monies, it is my recollection that the 
refund check was made payable to Major Oil 
Corporation and Suitter, Axland and Armstrong, 
my law firm. 
Those funds were delivered to Major Oil 
Corporation in January -- and I think it is 
in 1976 -- and were undoubtedly utilized to 
pay off ongoing expenses of Major Oil 
Corporation during that first quarter of 
1976. 
THE WITNESS: But the 98,000 belonged to 
Arizona Fuels. 
Deposition of Eugene Dalton, pages 60-61. To the same effect, 
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see Dalton deposition pages 56, 64, 66-67 and 71. We hasten 
to add that it is not our purpose to question the conduct of 
counsel, who we consider of the highest integrity and talent. 
The point, however, is that we do not have the same confidence 
in Mr. Dalton, who stands charged with fraud, and the imposi-
tion of both the receivership and the class action would serve 
to permit the court, rather than Mr. Dalton, to decide if the 
check made payable to Major Oil Corporation "belonged to 
Arizona Fuels." If, on the other hand, the claim belongs to 
the corporate entity Mr. Dalton may be left in a position to 
make that determination. 
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POINT V 
APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER IS 
APPROPRIATE AND NECESSARY 
Appellants urge that appointment of a receiver is 
inappropriate, again pointing to various allegations of the 
Complaint stated on information and belief. In doing so they 
ignore the allegations which are not stated on information and 
belief, which establish that plaintiffs are shareholders of 
Major Oil and defendants, other than the corporation, were 
its officers, and that the defendant officers are wrongfully 
disposing of assets of Major Oil in disregard of the interests 
of the plaintiffs and other creditors of Major Oil. Appellants 
raise the curious, and seemingly pointless argument at Br. 6 
that in the verification of the Complaint plaintiff Weaver 
states that it "is true of his own knowledge, except as to 
matters stated on information and belief." (emphasis by 
appellants) Obviously, the qualification does not apply 
to matters not alleged on information and belief, which are 
entirely sufficient to support appointment of a receiver. 
Appellants' entire argument on this point is mere 
surplussage, for it fails to so much as address the pertinent 
allegations of the Complaint i.e., those not stated on 
information and belief. Thus, the Kansas case, and the 
passages from Fletcher and American Jurisprudence cited at 
Br. 6-7 do not even bear on the subject. 
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The matter of appointment of a receiver, like the 
matter of maintenance of a class action, is one clearly 
committed to the sound discretion of the Court. ~ ~ 
Daisy Gold Mining Co., 22 Utah 457, 63 Pac. 185 (1900). 
Contrary to the representations of defendants, there is time 
honored Utah authority on how that discretion is to be 
exercised. Stevens v. South Ogden Land, Building~ Emp. Co., 
14 Utah, 232, 47 Pac 81 (1896) was a case functionally 
identical with the matter at bar, the defendants being officers 
and directors of a corporation in which the minority share-
holders alleged that the assets were being diverted contrary 
to the interests of the shareholders and other creditors. This 
Court observed that appointment of a receiver was designed to 
"secure the rights and interests of all those affected by the 
fraud" and held that "the ends of distributive justice mani-
fested by this Complaint call for a liberal application of the 
flexible principles of equity." Id. at 83. Significantly, 
and apropos the holding in Stevens, the allegations of the 
Complaint, and in particular the allegations at paragraphs 15, 
16 , 19 , 2 2 , 2 4 , 2 6 , 31 , 3 4 , 3 5 , 3 6 and 4 6 ( R. 6 3, 6 4-6 5, 6 6 and 
68) set up significant claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary 
duties and conversion and paragraph 44 (R.67-68) sets up 
additional fraud claims which are not stated on information 
and belief. Stevens remains the law in Utah, and has been 
reaffirmed in other cases holding that appointment of a re-
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ceiver is appropriate to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders and other creditors of a corporation. ~, 
Walker Brothers Bankers~ Intermountain Milling Co., 65 Utah, 
340, 237 Pac. 228 (1925). 
Considering the Utah policy of liberal application 
of the equitable remedy of appointment of a receiver, and the 
uncontroverted allegations of the verified Amended Complaint, 
it could not be convincingly urged that Judge Dee's appoint-
A-t' 
ment of a receiver herein was ~ abuse of discretion. More-
.-, 
over, appellants fail to suggest any way in which they are 
prejudiced by the appointment of a receiver. Their urging at 
Br. 8 that it will interfere with the management of the 
corporation by its directors is disingenuous, at best, for 
the Dalton deposition makes clear that it is already subject 
to proceedings functionally equivalent to a bankruptcy by 
reason of the appointment of a trustee to take custody of its 
affairs in the federal courts. The appointment of a state 
court receiver is thus merely an added safeguard for creditors 
and shareholders. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of this case may well transcend the 
issues between the parties. Representing, as it does, the 
first occasion for this Court to speak on the modern class 
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action it also represents an opportunity for the implementa-
tion of an enlightened procedural reform which, if properly 
conceived, can do much to streamline the judiciary. 
That the federal courts have assumed the lead in the 
development of class actions is in part attributable to the 
fact that rights under federal laws (i.e., securities law, 
environmental law, etc.) lend themselves better to the tech-
nique, but it is also in large part because there is a body of 
precedent in the federal courts that is unavailable in the 
state courts. Accordingly, we urge that this Court take this 
occasion to give an expansive reading to Rule 23 which will 
enable the courts of this state to take their rightful place 
in this important area of procedural reform. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, Esq. 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
PARKER M. NIELSON, Esq. 
318 Kearns Building 
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